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THE SYmboLs o GOVEMMaIENT. By Thurman W. Arnold. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press. $2.50.
THE debate on legal foundations is one of the most symptomatic characteristics
of our time. Nowhere else, perhaps, is the dissatisfaction of most creative minds
with existing formulae more clearly shown. And in that debate, Professor Arnold's
book is, in my own judgment, likely to occupy a significant place. By this I do not
mean that it is likely to be popular; there are two reasons why this should be so.
In the first place, it is an essay in the ironib mood, and neither the academic nor
the practical mind is fond of the ironic approach. In the second place, it brings no
clear-cut formulae to the problems it confronts. Almost invariably, popular books
are those which end with a set of specific formulae capable of facile repetition.
Professor Arnold has preferred to indicate an approach to legal analysis rather than
directly to attempt the analysis itself. He has written brilliantly, suggestively, and
with an impressive width of material at his command, a prolegomena to the study
of legal institutions rather than a decisive theory of their working. It is a valuable
book, likely to be the more suggestive the more eagerly the reader brings his own
point of view to its study. It is the kind of book, I venture to think, the harvest of
which is a long time a-gathering; but it is also the kind of work which no one who
seeks patiently to weigh its argument will ever be likely to forget.
Roughly, its argument may be stated as follows: Legal institutions and methods are
still in a pre-scientific stage. They represent ways of thought in which we work
with postulates likely to afford us the results we desire rather than the results of
-which a society like our own has need. We use symbols which are in the main the
deposit of wishful tbinking; and their deposit, again, is a system of passionate habitua-
tions resistant to urgent change. The judge, the trial lawyer, the legislature, the
-vested interest, all, so to say, think as they live; and out of their thinking they
make of legal processes a drama in which each of them is always the victorious hero.
To attack the theme of the play is inadmissible for the simple reason that the player
will not surrender the right to applaud himself at the close. So that where objective
necessity attacks the actor's claims, he fights less to adapt his part to what necessity
demands, than to adapt necessity to his part. The thing we wish to be or to do
becomes an idea; and, however out of place in a rapidly changing world, we fight
for the ideal and seek, somehow or other, and regardless of cost, to protect it from
the assault of men who refuse to realize its rights. The result is a legal science which
either refuses, or is in large degree unable, to harmonize itself with the new civilia-
tion behind which it lags. We need to give up our romanticism. Only the adapta-
tion of our faiths to science can give them that adequacy which will enable us to
be masters of our fate.
So bare a summary as this does less than even an approximation of justice to the
rich material with which Professor Arnold has driven home his point. Whether it
is by analysing the process of a criminal trial; whether it is by an account of the
hostility of the courts to the new administrative jurisdiction; whether it is from the
study of the mechanisms of law enforcement; whether, almost above all, it is by his
penetrating comment on the substance of contemporary legal philosophies; Professor
Arnold is, in my judgment, able to make out a case for a new realism, a new under-
standing,-first, of what the problems are, and, second, of the inadequacy of the
assumptions (usually unconscious) that we bring to their solution-that are fresh
and invaluable. He writes with wit and point, always. He has the gift of pungent
phrase. He has a good deal of that creative irreverence for the traditional which
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has made Mr. Keynes so easily the most invigorating of contemporary economists.
No one, I think, can read the first nine chapters of this book with any feelings short
of gratitude and admiration.
Where, I think, he will be dissatisfied is with the final chapter. It is not that it
does not contain a good deal of wise and witty reflection; it does. It is rather that
here Professor Arnold has failed to relate the results of his previous inquiry to the
true process in which they are involved. Using the psychologist's scalpel, he has
brought the lawyer's and the politician's unconscious before them. He has exposed
their irrationality. He has made it evident how wholly unscientific they are. What,
I suggest, he has failed to do is to explain what it is that gives to that unconscious
the specific substance it enfolds. And that he has failed to do for a simple reason.
While he knows how he wants law to work, he neither knows (a) what it is to work
for, nor (b) what will compel it to work in that way. He lacks, in a word, a
philosophy of history; and no true science of law is possible unless its assumptions
are built on a philosophy of history that enables us to predict the large consequences.
of the system in which we are involved.
Professor Arnold, in my own view, has missed this key to the door he seeks to un-
lock because he has concentrated his attention on individual minds, whether the
politician's, the judge's, the legal philosopher's, instead of upon, at least in equal
measure, the historical medium, the social environment, in and through which they
are working. The institutional apparatus of society, therefore, remains for him a
body of concepts which he has not explained to himself with the same devastating
realism as he has brought to the analysis of individual men. Had he sought to grasp
why the state is, and what it does in history; had he seen the "government" as a
force exercising the authority of the state for the purposes "implicated" in the
state's historical relations; had he analysed the operation of property-relations in
their bearing upon the substance of the unconscious he has so relentlessly probed;
the result would have been a revelation of the ends of law in terms of the motives
it seeks to satisfy, which would have solved that central problem he is uneasily aware
of throughout, without ever forthrightly meeting. If I may psychoanalyse Professor
Arnold, as he has done his own victims, I suspect that his own irony is a mask be-
hind which is concealed his own doubt of reason. That is why his last chapter is a
prayer and a plea instead of a method and a prediction. He feels that something
ought to be done, and soon, but he does not know what ought to be done. So he
ends with the faith that, somehow, the energy and intelligence of America will find
a better way.
So, no doubt it will. But that is not a conclusion worthy of the Professor Arnold
who contrasts the lawyer's technique with that of the man of science. The doctor is
not satisfied to pray for a cure of cancer; he devotes himself to discovering the
etiology of the disease. I think Professor Arnold could find that etiology for law by
discovering a philosophy of history which explains what the law is seeking to do.
The one philosophy of history, so far as I can see, which does this effectively is that
associated with the names of Marx and Engels. Once we realize that the legal rela-
tions of society are, broadly speaking, the expression of class-relations, once we
recognize in the state supreme coercive power held at the disposal of those who own
the instruments of production, the processes of law begin to clarify themselves in a
fundamental way. In a paper in a previous number of this Journal,1 Mr. Max
Lerner has brilliantly shown how this approach enables us to understand the history
of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is the clue to the understanding of
the Napoleonic code; it alone makes the substance of Soviet Law intelligible. Given
1. The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 668.
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a Marxist approach to the issues confronting American law today, and a fruitful
analysis of their outcome can be made the basis of confident prediction. Without
it, we become the victims of that wishful thinking of which, I venture to think,
Professor Arnold's last chapter is an example.
But I do not wish to end on a critical note. The main need is that this brilliant
book should be widely read. American jurisprudence is on the march. The work of
Frankfurter and his colleagues on the injunction and on the Supreme Court, of Max
Lerner on the relation between law and economics, of Charles Clark on procedure,
of Hamilton on torts, of Corwin, of Morris Cohen, of Mr. Justice Cardozo--these
mark the advent of a new epoch in legal thinking. They parallel those great decisions
of Holmes and Brandeis, J. J., in which those eminent men showed that a con-
scious insight into the purposes of law might adapt its institutions and doctrines to
new and creative ends. Professor Arnold's book is worthy of this company. Higher
praise than this I do not know. It means that he has joined a band of thinkers
-who, in their several ways, are renewing the foundations of modem jurisprudence.
Hao= J. Laszat
London, England
PaVATE INTERNATiONAL LAw. By G. C. Cheshire. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press,
1935. Pp. Ix, 584.
Tnrs book is written by a recognized authority on the English law of real property,
who became fascinated with private international law because of its perfect contrast
with his own specialty. Here was a subject "not overloaded with detailed rules,"
only lightly touched "by the paralyzing hand of the Parliamentary draftsman," in
regard to which "a coherent body of law" was still in the process of formation. What
an opportunity for the jurist to exercise his wits in an attempt to reduce the deci-
sions and pronouncements of the courts relating to the subject to some kind of order
and system! Unlike some of his continental confreres, and in true British fashion,
Dr. Cheshire set himself this more modest task, rather than seeking universal solu-
tions for the problems of the Conflict of Laws on the basis of some a priori theory.
In fact, his immediate object was to provide the English student with a shorter account
of the Conflict of Laws than that found in the standard English treatises, such as
those of Dicey, Westlake and Foote.
In dealing with the decisions of the English courts, Dr. Cheshire takes a more in-
dependent and critical attitude than is usually the case with English writers. Thus,
he condemns the well-established doctrine, first laid down in Leroux v. Brown, that
the fourth section of the English Statute of Frauds embodies a procedural rule. It
would have been well if Chalmers and Williston had seen the same light and in-
corporated the correct view in drafting the English Sales of Goods Act and the American
Uniform Sales Act, instead of extending, or attempting to extend, the rule of Lcroux
v. Brown to the sale of goods. Difficult to reconcile with Dr. Cheshire's view regarding
the Statute of Frauds is his approval of Hoadly v. Northern Transportation Co., which
held that the question -whether the acceptance by a shipper of a bill of lading con-
taining stipulations limiting the carrier's liability constituted assent thereto, related
to procedure, governed by the law of the forum, rather than to the formation of the
contract.
Dr. Cheshire familiarizes the reader with the difficult problems of "qualifications'-
he prefers to call it "classification"--and renvoi. The former is presented where the
countries in question have the same rules of the conflict of laws, but the subject matter
t Professor of Political Science, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
1. 12 C. B. 801 (1852).
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to which they relate is classified differently-for example, one says that it affects
"capacity" and the other, "form"; or one says that a property question and the other,
that a contract question is involved, etc. By which law is this conflict in categories to
be settled? Following W. E. Beckett, Dr. Cheshire is satisfied that the answer to
the problem of qualifications is to be found in analytical jurisprudence based on
the result of the study of comparative laws. It would seem, however, that even if
the value of analytical jurisprudence from a theoretical point of view were conceded,
it would not afford a "practical" solution to the problem of qualifications in the con-
flict of laws. The study of Comparative Law, however, is of importance in this con-
nection. If the facts in a conflict of laws problem concern two foreign countries
only, both of which would classify the subject matter in the same manner, such
classification should be followed elsewhere. Comparative law would thus assist the
judge in reaching a proper decision. With respect to the problem of renvol, Dr.
Cheshire does not express a firm conviction. The view regarding the rules of the
conflict of laws as referring only to the internal law of the foreign country, to the
exclusion of its rules of the conflict of laws, appears to him as furnishing "perhap3
the natural solution." He points out that the present position of the English courts,
according to which an English judge must render the same decision as the foreign
court does not avoid the "unending circle," for, if the foreign law should take the
same attitude as the English, theoretically no solution would be possible.
Out of line with the realistic approach generally taken by Dr. Cheshire is his accept-
ance of the vested rights theory as the underlying basis of the conflict of laws. In
accepting this theory, he follows in the footsteps of Dicey, Beale and the Restatement
of the Conflict of Laws. In some instances, as in the case of Torts, this theory in-
fluences his conclusion regarding the soundness or unsoundness of a given decision.
However, in most cases he does not allow the theory to affect his practical judgment
regarding the disposition of the particular problem. This is especially noticeable in
the field of contracts. For example, contrary to the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws by the American Law Institute, he maintains that there should be an exception
to the rule that a contract by correspondence is deemed made in the state in which
the letter of acceptance is mailed, namely, where the place of mailing does not have a
genuine and substantial connection with the parties or the contract. In the matter
of formalities, Dr. Cheshire favors an alternative rule, according to which the con-
tract should be valid if it satisfies either the law of the place of execution or the
"proper law" of the contract. Again, where a contract is made in one country to be
performed in another, Dr. Cheshire favors the law of the place of performance as the
law to which the parties must be reasonably deemed to have intended to submit them-
selves. To contracts having reference to two or more legal systems and containing
stipulations which are invalid under the law of one of them, Dr. Cheshire would apply
"the doctrine of efficacy," according to which a strong presumption should be raised
in favor of the system of law that will render the contract effective. All of this is
heterodox from the standpoint of the vested rights theory of the American Law In-
stitute.
As a whole, Dr. Cheshire's book deserves the highest commendation. Lucid in
manner of presentation, well-balanced, and exhibiting throughout good sense and en-
thusiasm, it is one of the best student's books on Conflict of Laws ever written.
ERNEsT G. LORFNZENt
New Haven, Connecticut
2. 115 Mass. 304 (1874).
tProfessor of Law, Yale University.
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FEDERAL INcomE TAX HANDBOOK, 1935-36. By Robert H. Montgomery. New
York: The Ronald Press Co. 1935. Pp. xix, 1034.
FEDERAL TAm.S ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GFTs, 1935-36. By Robert H. Mont-
gomery and Roswell Magill. New York: The Ronald Press Co. 1935. Pp. x, 458.
ACCORDING to the prospectus of the publishers some 150,000 copies of the Mont-
gomery Tax Manuals have been issued. Their popularity is deserved. They are, as
a whole, reliable, concise, and readable, and deal with the accounting as well as
the legal phases of the subjects. These two latest manuals measure up to the high
standard previously established.
The "Income Tax Handbook, 1935-36," in addition to treating Federal income
taxes as applied to individuals and corporations, covers the capital stock and the
excess profits taxes. Discussions are directed to the statutes now in force, principally
the provisions of the Revenue Acts of 1934 and 1935. Decisions and rulings asriing
under earlier acts are, however, discussed where in point as regards the existing law.
A principal feature of the book is that the author frequently gives his personal
opinions on controversial and doubtful points.' It is a feature which is helpful to
the well informed reader, but detracts somewhat from the usefulness of the book by
way of citation, especially in matters pending in the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Were the book less personal, it would lose some of the individual flavor which one
enjoys in reading it; at the same time, a less personal approach would probably be
more effective.
In the Preface, Colonel Montgomery criticizes some of the principal features of
the taxing statute and the manner in which, generally speaking, the law is adminis-
tered. In his opinion:
"Our federal income tax law is grossly unfair; it violates the fundamentals of
scientific taxation; it taxes gross income and capital as well as net income; parts
of it are unconstitutional; it is permeated with the soak-the-rich stuff which is out
of place in a tax law; it is harsly administered." 2
One does not need to accept as gospel such criticisms as these to recognize, as this
review does, that there is a certain amount of truth in them. For example, it will
probably be admitted by practically all of those who are informed, both in and out
of the Government, that in some respects the law taxes gross income and capital as
well as net income, and that accordingly it is unfair and unscientific. The existing
treatment of capital gains and losses is the most flagrant example. 3 It is perhaps
too much to hope that after the elections the law in this and other respects will be
drastically revised.
Colonel Montgomery upbraids the Treasury for its practice of imposing a tax on
one taxpayer under one interpretation and on another taxpayer under a different and
conflicting interpretation.4 Common sense at first rebels at such a practice. At the
same time, since controversial law points must frequently be decided by the courts,
with the inevitable delays, there is something to be said in support of the idea that
taxpayers' cases should be kept open until the courts have given an answer. Should
the Treasury hazard a guess as to the final answers? If it guesses wrong, some tax-
payers will have paid when they should not have paid (although they may protect
1. See, for example, pp. 8, 114, 115, 178, 179, 180, 195, 197, 199, 202, 218, 223, 225,
234, 236, 307, 316, 332, 342, 354, 423, 514, 515, 521, 526.
2. Preface, p. ill.
3. See § 117, Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 714, 26 U. S. C. § 101(a) (1935). See aho
Hendricks, Federal Income Tax: Capital Gains and Losses (1935) 49 HAav. L. Rlv. 262.
4. Preface, p. iv.
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themselves by refund claims) and others will have wholly escaped the tax.6 The
conclusion, assuming a point of real doubt and a continuance of existing administra-
tive conditions, is obvious; the Treasury really has no choice, if it is to act fairly.0
Among the possible solutions are: (1) Less complicated statutory provisions; (2)
broader administrative discretion, provided the Treasury exercises it judiciously; (3)
active leadership on the part of the Government in the way of presenting sound
positions to the courts as distinguished from positions which might yield the most
revenue; (4) at the minimum, a continuance of the present policy only in situations
involving real doubt. Even under existing conditions, there are questions as to
which it is possible to predict with reasonable certainty the outcome in the courts.
In such cases, there appears to be no excuse for a vacillating attitude.
In the Preface, Colonel Montgomery also intimates that the Commissioner "does
exercise" the administrative powers which the law confers upon him, "but only in
favor of the Treasury."7 As to refund claims, he is perhaps extreme in the view
that instead of passing on them impartially, "the entire Bureau endeavors to find
ways and means of disallowing the claim."3  A less harsh criticism in this respect
would be fully warranted. "It is just as much the Bureau's duty to make refunds
legally due as it is to collect additional taxes." D
As to "tax avoidance," Colonel Montgomery mentions that it is "not a crime; it is
not a misdemeanor; it is not even reprehensible."' 1 He might have added that it
sometimes gets taxpayers into serious civil troubles, and that only the foolish will
embrace it too heartily. It will probably continue, however, for a long time, for
it is the inevitable concomitant of high rates and of complicated laws.
In, "Federal Taxes on Estates, Trusts and Gifts, 1935-36," Colonel Montgomery
is joined in authorship by Professor Roswell Magill. This book deals with (1) the
income tax on estates and trusts, (2) the estate tax, and (3) the gift tax, It is
splendidly done, and provides reliable information in a field where guide posts are
relatively few. Especially valuable and complete are its treatments of transfers
in "contemplation of death," transfers "intended to take effect in possession or en-
joyment at or after death," transfers with the right retained to designate who shall
possess or enjoy, and revocable trusts;11 also the chapter on valuation problems. 12
In the course of ten years, as indicated in the Preface, the Treasury has been
"steadily moving from the status of a comparatively modest beneficiary of sizable
estates" to that of "the surviving joint tenant who takes all."' 8  It is therefore
obvious that the Federal estate and gift taxes possess "a legal and fiscal significance
which entitles them to more elaborate treatment than is possible if they share space
in a single volume with other major federal taxes." 14  In order that the common
problems arising under the three different forms of federal taxation now applied to
estates and trusts may be considered side by side, the authors have wisely treated in
this volume the income tax upon estates and trusts, as well as the estate and gift
taxes.
The volume contains much that will be of value to anyone interested in the
science of taxation, as distinguished from practical interpretations of whatever law
is actually in force. Thus, although legislative policies are beyond the scope of the
5. Such a situation resulted when Warner v. Walsh, 15 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926)
was, in effect, reversed by Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U. S. 365 (1933).
6. Cf. Jackson, Equity in the Administration of Federal Taxes (1935) 13 T c MAoAZINE,
641, 644.
7. Seep. iv. 8. P.v.
9. Ibid. 10. P. ix.
11. See pp. 115 et seq. 12. Ch. 7.
13. P. iii. 14. Ibid.
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book, which is primarily devoted to the legal problems, the authors note with regret
that "the study of the social and economic effects of particular forms and rates of
taxation, which logically ought to precede their imposition, has in practice lagged far
behind the Treasury's demands for additional revenue."'1 And only the opportunist
can fail to pause on the statement that "the Treasury may not kill the goose that
lays the golden egg, but it is certainly giving it a good run across the country."10
Thus, also, the inequities of the estate tax, as compared with an inheritance tax,
are pointed out. For example, the burden of the former in effect falls upon the
beneficiaries who would otherwise receive what must now be paid in tax; also a be-
quest of the same size out of a large estate will be subject to a larger levy than a
bequest of the same amount from a smaller estate.17  Such considerations, vhich
become important when the rates are high, may point to the eventual substitution
of a Federal inheritance tax system for the estate tax.1s At several other points
the authors approach questions of taxing policy from a sociological rather than a
legalistic standpoint.' 9
The authors' criticism of the present estate tax law as being unnecessarily com-
plicated by the fact that the law consists of the applicable provisions of the 1926
Act, as amended by the 1928, 1932, 1934, and 1935 Acts, and also the additional
estate tax imposed by the 1932 Act as amended by the 1935 Act, is well merited.20
One shares with them the view that it is unfortunate that Congress does not codify
the law. It is, indeed, scandalous that codification has been so long delayed.
At various places in the book, opinions are stated with regard to difficult questions
of law which the courts have yet to decide. Unfortunately, the opinions are some-
times given as "the author's," 2' and one is left to wonder "which author?" This
feature is not up to standard in what is really a most sound and highly useful work.
Ho, rn HENDriCHS.t
Washington, D. C.
THE LAW oP BoNDs AND BOND SEcuRnnrs. By Leonard A. Jones, Fourth Edition
by Renzo D. Bowers. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mlerrill Co., 1935. 3 Vols. pp. xlvii
629; xviii 601, xiii, 720.
Tnxs edition, as the title page indicates, is a fourth generation product tracing its
ancestry back to the "Jones on Railroad Securities" published in 1879. In the shift-
ing tables of contents of the successive editions, major stages in the development of
corporate financing in this country are mirrored. The original work was prompted,
for example, by "the recent extraordinary development of the railroad system in
this country," and written in an atmosphere, expressed in the following excerpt
from its preface:
..... while the present development of the law of corporate securities is such
as to render possible a systematic statement of it, the decisions are not so
numerous as to debar the author from a separate statement and emmination
is. Pp. ili-iv. 16. P. iv.
17. See p. 106.
18. Cf. the inheritance tax measure [H. R. 8974, 201 et seq., 74th Cong., Ist Se.
(1935)], proposed at the last session of Congress, and reprinted as Appmdix II of the
book. If adopted, however, that measure would have been supplementary and, not in
substitution of the estate tax.
19. See pp. 149, 156, and 216. 20. See p. 106.
21. See pp. 50, 66, 68, 134, 219.
t Member of the District of Columbia Bair.
19361
YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the most important of them, or from quoting freely from the opinions
of the learned judges to explain and confirm new and leading principles."
The book was not, in fact, confined to railroad issues. Available cases dealing with
other types of corporate mortgages were cited and discussed. But the only variety
of security seeming to the author to require treatment separate and distinct from
that accorded those issued by railroads was the class of municipal bonds issued in
aid of railroads and other corporations.
With the second edition, appearing in 1890, the title became "Corporate Bonds and
Mortgages," to more accurately indicate the true scope of the work. Much of the
book had to be rewritten, but railroad cases still predominated. The chapter on
municipal railroad-aid bonds, however, was dropped. For municipals, as the author
recognized in explanation, had developed into a distinct field.
In 1907 the author offered his third edition, similarly entitled. Commenting on
developments in the law since 1890, he noted "numerous decisions of secondary
importance" relating to railroad securities, but was chiefly impressed by "a wonder.
ful development in the use of corporate organizations in all kinds of business enter-
prises."
The present work is a considerable enlargement of its predecessor, as the many
intervening years would lead one to expect. Volume I, indeed, is entirely now,
being devoted to municipal bonds. Volumes II and III are a continuation of the
older work, but happily much more comprehensive in scope. For "Corporate Bonds
and Mortgages" had been conceived primarily as a continuation of Jones's treatise
on "Mortgages of Real Property," whereas the present edition breaks this tie. The
successive chapters of the last two volumes treat first of bonds apart from their
securities, discussing corporate power to issue, blue sky laws and the requirements
of state commissions, the genesis of bond proceedings and issual steps and require-
ments, on through the topics considered in the earlier works, to corporate reorganiza-
tion, in general, and under the Bankruptcy Act. The Federal Securities Act of
1933 as amended and the Holding Company Act are reprinted in an appendix, but
not treated in detail.
The treatise as a whole impresses this reviewer as a neatly organized, lucidly
written and usable manual. It is no hack job. The author has exerted himself in
every section to yield forthright conclusions without hedging. But partly in conse-
quence, perhaps, the treatment of most of the topics covered is sketchy.
Turning to Volume I, for example, one finds treatment of but few of the trouble-
some problems arising out of current efforts to readjust the funded indebtedness of
defaulting municipalities and other local governments. The municipal debt readjust-
ment measure enacted by Congress in 1934 as Sections 78-80 of the Bankruptcy
Act is simply reprinted, with a footnote citing three lower federal court decisions
with respect to its constitutionality. The problem and possibilities of state legislative
and administrative control over municipal debt readjustment-a live issue in recent
and pending litigation between certain New Jersey municipalities and their bond-
holders'L-is untouched, save for quotations from the Blaisdell opinion. One finds
no analysis of the open question-now delaying the clearing up of many a default-
whether recently enacted tax limitation statutes and other state legislation impairing
the security of municipal bonds will affect refunding bonds subsequently issued and
to what extent.
Examples could be multiplied, but we can scarcely quarrel with a treatise of com-
prehensive scope on that score. The author's avowed purpose "to offer a discussion
of the subject so thorough, and in such detail, and buttressed by such an array of
judicial authority from the earliest precedents to the very latest adjudications, that
1. For a stimulating analysis, see (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 702.
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the practioner, with this book and his own state statutes and Constitution before
him, need look no further for any phase of the law applying to commercial bonds
and their securities" does, however, invite discount.
New Haven, Connecticut GEonGE H. DaSSIONt
FoRD ON EvnDENcE. 4 Vols., pp. xliv, 3043. Mathew Bender & Co. 1935.
The law of evidence, to a large extent, is a study of the etiquette of examining
witnesses in the trial court. There has been an increasing tendency to use the for-
mula of prejudicial error in order to avoid reversals on rulings of evidence. This
has been particularly noticeable in equity cases or in cases tried without a jury.
Evidence is thus becoming less and less capable of being studied exclusively from
the written opinions of the appellate court.
Nevertheless, the fact that the heavy penalty of reversal may no longer follow
an erroneous ruling on evidence does not mean that the subject has lost its import-
ance. Bungling the introduction of documents, failure at the trial to make clear-cut
arguments justifying the admission or exclusion of testimony, neglect in making
proper objections at the proper time, may lead to rulings which could have been
avoided and for which there is no redress because of the tendency of appellate courts
not to interfere with the trial judge. A lawyer who knows the etiquette of the intro-
duction of testimony has a tremendous advantage over an unskillful opponent because
he cannot be harassed and confused by constant interruptions. It is not sufficient
in the trial of a case that an objection be overruled. If the objection is plausible
and gets considerable treatment from the judge, its effect in interrupting a witness in
his most dramatic moments may be most unfortunate. Thus the arena of conflict
over points of evidence has shifted from the appellate to the trial court.
For this reason the teacher of evidence must assume the burden of getting more
of his material from trial records. The fact that Mr. Ford's book collects a vast
amount of material from actual records in the trial court, thus should make it espec-
ially valuable to the teacher of evidence. These excerpts from trial records con-
stitute the main body of the work. The statements of the rules are brief and consti-
tute only a framework on which the material taken from the records is laid. One
-who is in search of a restatement of evidence might regard the analytical statements
of law in the book as inadequate. This, however, is not a fair criticism because
these statements are obviously a method of classifying records. Considered as
such they do offer a fairly good index to the material. The book is therefore most
valuable to a teacher who is hunting for illustrations of the operation of rules. It
is a very practical aid in teaching in question and answer form, and for that reason
.alone should entitle Mr. Ford to an expression of thanks from the teaching pro-
fession. Although the book is primarily intended for New York lawyers, a large
number of the excerpts from trial records are relevant in any jurisdiction.
New Haven, Conn. THunuA W. ARNoLDIr
tAss't Professor of Law, Yale University.
tProfessor of Law, Yale University
1936]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
By PACIFIC M/ANs. By Manley 0. Hudson. New Haven: Yale University Press.
1935. Pp. viii, 200.
Tins most recent work of Professor Hudson consists of four lectures delivered by
him in March, 1935, at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Boston. The
lectures constitute the first hundred pages. The last hundred pages consist of nine
appendices: (1) the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
The Hague, 1907, and parties to that convention as well as the 1899 convention as
of April 1, 1935; (2) the Covenant of the League of Nations with its amendments,
and a list of its members; (3) the Protocol of Signature and Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice with its amendments, and a list of its members;
(4) the "Gondra Treaty" and parties thereto; (5) the "Pact of Paris," more popularly
known as the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and parties thereto; (6) the General Act for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and parties thereto; (7) the Inter-
American Convention on Arbitration, Washington, 1929, the Protocol of Progressive
Arbitration, Washington, 1929, and parties to the former; (8) the Inter-American
Convention on Conciliation, Washington, 1929, the Additional Protocol, Montevideo,
1933, and parties to the former; and (9) the "Saavedra-Lamas Treaty," and its
position in August 1, 1935. There is a foreword by Dean Halford L. Hoskins of the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The implication to be drawn from Mr.
Hudson's introduction is that the "Pact of Paris" is the most significant international
act since the Covenant of the League. The title of the book is taken from Article
II of that treaty.
Chapter I deals briefly with the law of peaceful settlement before 1914. Chapter
II, which to the reviewer seems the most significant chapter of the book, deals with
peaceful settlement through the League of Nations. Professor Hudson hits the
keynote of the chapter when he states (p. 21): "The Covenant of the League of
Nations stands out as the highwater mark in the history of efforts to provide for the
pacific settlement of international disputes." The chief strength of the Covenant, in his
opinion, is that concrete institutions of a continuous nature are set up, rather than an
outline of methods to be followed, as in the Hague Conventions, or a mere declaration
of purpose, as in the Pact of Paris. In Mr. Hudson's view the principal sanction of the
League is public opinion and a public airing of the facts. So far more than sixty dis.
putes have been dealt with by the League, all but two of them by the Council. Among
the disputes seriously affecting world peace, which have been dealt with satisfactorily
by the League, are: The Aaland Islands case, the frontier between Germany and
Poland in Upper Silesia, the Jaworzina boundary between Czechoslovakia and Poland
in 1924, the 1925 boundary dispute between Bulgaria and Greece, the boundary dis-
pute between Iraq and Turkey as to Mosul in 1924 and 1925, the Leticia dispute
between Columbia and Peru in 1933, and the terrorist dispute between Jugoslavia and
Hungary in 1934. Among its failures Professor Hudson lists the Vilna question
between Lithuania and Poland, the Corfu incident between Greece and Italy in 1923,
the Manchuria case between Japan and China, and the Chaco dispute between
Bolivia and Paraguay.
The third chapter deals with the Permanent Court of International Justice.
Professor Hudson does not, as some protagonists of the court, assert that it is not
a part of the League of Nations. He admits that the question may be answered
either way, but contends that no reflection is cast on the court no matter what the
answer is. Although the court, like the old Permanent Court of Arbitration, lacks
compulsory jurisdiction of disputes, forty-two nations have ratified the "optional
clause" giving the court compulsory jurisdiction as to certain legal disputes. This
number includes most of the stronger states as well as the weaker ones. In addition,
many treaties, both multipartite and bipartite, confer jurisdiction on the court.
Professor Hudson believes that the advisory jurisdiction of the court, which con.
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sumes almost half of its time, has been very useful. Thus, some of these advisory
opinions have involved issues endangering peace: (1) the dispute between Great
Britain and France as to nationality decrees in Tunis and Morocco; (2) the
Jaworzina boundary dispute between Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1923; and (3)
the customs Regime dispute between Austria and Germany in 1931. In fact Mr.
Hudson asserts that the Court's chief contribution to peace will be through its
advisory opinions, which have the advantage of enabling states, without arbitrating
or adjudicating, to procure authoritative assistance and yet at the Same time reserve
a large degree of freedom of action. The procedure in advisory opinions has been
increasingly assimilated to that in contentious jurisdiction. Interested states may be
heard at all stages; and, since 1927, ad hoc judges may be appointed by the states
interested in a dispute concerning which an advisory opinion is requested.
Among the broader influences of the Court on the development ol peaceful
processes of settlement is the building of a new body of ever mounting case-law.
Arbitral tribunals which sat only temporarily and whose personnel was shifting
-were in no position to develop a satisfactory case-law.
The final chapter deals with treaties on pacific settlement since 1920. Such
treaties owe their creation, in Mr. Hudson's opinion, chiefly to the existence of the
League and the Court. The pre-war treaties were extremely defective. The parties
had to agree on a statement of the question to be arbitrated, upon the personnel
of the arbitral tribunal and upon the procedure to be followed. Moreover the
parties would usually insist that a given dispute involved their "national honor" or
"vital interest," and hence was not subject to arbitration at all. The Bryan treaties,
providing for fact-finding commissions and "cooling-off" periods, were never resorted
to. After 1920 a new development began. Treaties were drawn providing for
conciliation, arbitration, and compulsory adjudication, or some combination of
them. By 1935, over two hundred such treaties had been registered with the League.
A number of multipartite treaties have been entered into, among these the Protocol
of Geneva, which, however, proved abortive because of a provision that it should
not come into force until a plan for the reduction of armaments was adopted.
In addition, the Assembly of the League in 1928 launched the General Act for the
Pacific Settlement of International disputes, codifying the law providing for con-
ciliation, arbitration, and adjudication according to the most modem methods. Since
1933, nonaggression treaties have become common under the leadership of Soviet
Russia. Of lesser importance and scope are the inter-American conventions, the
Gondra Treaty of 1923, the two Washington Conventions of 1929, and the Saavedras-
Lamas Treaty of 1933. Mr. Hudson is critical of these agreements, however, con-
tending that few, even of the best treaties adopted since 1920, have been applied
in practice. With the barren record of achievement under these agreements, he
contrasts the record of "intensely practical achievement" of the League and Court.
A fundamental weakness of these agreements is that they rely very largely on ad hoc
agencies. Their strength lies in their insistence upon international order and their
tie-up with such permanent institutions as the Court and League.
In his conclusion Mir. Hudson gives specific attention to the Pact of Paris. He
regards it as more than the expression of a pious hope. It is implemented by the
Court, the League, and the treaties discussed above. Wlhile it is general in its
undertakings, this generality may be defended as necessary to secure the support
of many nations. The Pact is not to be scrutinized like a contract or deed in
private law; nor is its utility to be tested "by stressing its possible weakness in the
most unfavorable of the improbable situations in which it may be tested." Although
this machinery of peaceful settlement, composed by the Pact, the League, the
Court, and the treaties, is not regarded by the author as a necessary assurance of
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peace, he holds it superior to what the machinery of peaceful settlement has ever
previously been.
This is one of Professor Hudson's best books. It is concise, yet in one hundred
pages present a comprehensive survey. It is not simply a factual presentation;
at every point there is a forceful presentation of the author's own conclusions,
LESTER B. Onnnwf
Lincoln, Nebraska
tProfessor of Law, University of Nebraska Law School.
